Meister Eckhart and Jan Van Ruusbroec: A Comparison by van Nieuwenhove, Rik
Meister Eckhart and Jan Van Ruusbroec:
A Comparison
RIK VAN NIEUWENHOVE
Trinity College, Dublin
RIK VAN NIEUW ENHOVEMEISTER ECKHART AND JAN VAN RUU SBROEC: A COMPARISON
Jan Van Ruusbroec (1293–1381), the most important spiritual writer of the
Low Countries, is often associated (with or without some qualifications)
with the tradition of the Rhineland Mystics, of which Meister Eckhart (c.
1260–1327) is the most prominent exponent.1 To date however, an in-depth
study of the influence of Meister Eckhart’s main doctrinal positions on
Ruusbroec’s thought has not been published.2 In this paper I want to
compare their central ideas concerning the relation between God and his
creation (in particular man). More specifically, I hope to make clear that
the vocabulary they occasionally share (Birth of the Son in the soul, the
spark of the soul, the ground of the soul, the soul as Image, and so on)
actually veils two very different theologies.
Although I do not aspire to originality in presenting Eckhart’s thought,
I am aware that a presentation of his challenging doctrine is already an
interpretation itself. I will use a text from Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae to
unlock his thought.3 Eckhart emphasizes both the fundamental depend-
ence of creatures on God and the absolute otherness of God whereby he
radicalizes the traditional teaching (to be found in Thomas Aquinas) that
creatures are like God but that God is unlike his creation. Thus Eckhart can
state that God as intellect is beyond being and that being is God; that God
should not be called “good” and that creatures insofar as they are good, are
God, and so on.
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1. For instance O. Davies, The Rhineland Mystics: An anthology (London: SPCK,
1989); O. Davies, God Within: The mystical Tradition of Northern Europe (London:
Darton, Longman & Todd,  1988). L. Cognet, Introduction aux mystiques  rhéno-
flamands (Paris: Desclée, 1968).
2. E. Colledge and J. C. Marler, “‘Poverty of the Will’: Ruusbroec, Eckhart and
The Mirror of Simple Souls,” Jan Van Ruusbroec: The Sources, Content and Sequels of His
Mysticism, ed. P. Mommaers and N. De Paepe (Leuven: Leuven University Press,
1984), p. 14–47 is a possible exception, although the article focuses primarily on
the influence of Marguerite Porete on Eckhart and Ruusbroec and only secondarily
on the relation between Eckhart and Ruusbroec.
3. ST I. 4.3 ad 3.
Following this, I will focus on Eckhart’s doctrine of the Trinity and its
close connection to his understanding of creation (bullitio and ebullitio), his
negative anthropology and more in particular, in section two of the first Part,
his theology of the Image (with a particular focus on the role of the intellect)
which offers an interesting starting point for a comparison with Ruusbroec.
The second part of this article sketches Ruusbroec’s trinitarian doc-
trine, with a special emphasis on the role of the Spirit as an active principle
of regyratio. I will try to indicate Ruusbroec’s indebtedness to and divergence
from Bonaventure so as to highlight the originality of the approach of the
Flemish Prior. In a second section of the part dealing with Ruusbroec, I will
explore his theology of  the Image  in the  course  of which his distinct
approach will become evident.
It will transpire that Ruusbroec’s thought differs radically in inspiration
and nature from that of Eckhart in almost each doctrinal area: trinitarian
doctrine (no Godhead beyond the divine Persons; emphasis on Spirit as
active principle of regyratio), christology and soteriology (distinctive empha-
sis, absent in Eckhart’s writings, on the life and humanity of Christ whose
mission has to be seen in the light of the nature of Love as do ut des),
theology of grace and sacramental theology (Ruusbroec draws a clear dis-
tinction between God’s creative and re-creative activity and stresses the need
for grace made available in the sacraments, especially in the Eucharist),
anthropology (memory, not intellect as ground of the soul; no connatural-
ity between divine and human intellect), and the like.
It may surprise some readers that I consider Ruusbroec a theologian.
Indeed, contrary to what some scholars presume, I take for granted that
Ruusbroec is more than merely a “mystical writer” or even “a phenomenolo-
gist of the mystical experience,”4 but rather a spiritual writer who has an
important and original theological contribution to make. I trust this text
will demonstrate the accuracy of this presupposition.
I. MEISTER ECKHART
A. A General Outline of Meister Eckhart’s Doctrine
A key problem in the interpretation of Eckhart’s thought is the way he
understands the relation between God and creatures. On the one hand, he
affirms the radical otherness of God in often colourful language: “God is
4. This is how P. Mommaers characterises Ruusbroec. Mommaers’s work is a
typical example of the tendency to focus on mystical “experience” separate from
the broader theological framework. Such an approach is indebted to W. James’s The
Varieties of Religious Experience. A Study in Human Nature, first published in 1902. See
Mommaers’s latest book, with J. Van Bragt: Mysticism Buddhist and Christian. Encoun-
ters with Jan Van Ruusbroec (New York: Crossroad, 1995).
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not ‘good’, or ‘better’ or ‘best’. Whoever should say God is good would do
him as much injustice as if he were to call the sun black.”5 Elsewhere
however he seems to assert the identity of creaturely and divine perfections:
the good man, insofar as he is good, is “unmade and uncreated.” “That
which is good and goodness are nothing else than one single goodness in
everything, apart from the one bearing and the other being born.”6
How can Eckhart say that God is totally unlike his creation and claim at
the same time that creaturely perfections are so dependent on God to the
point where they appear to become identical to the divine perfections? In
my opinion an article from Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae can throw
some light on this problem.
Although it may be admitted that creatures are in some sort like God,
it must nowise be admitted that God is like creatures; because, as
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix): “A mutual likeness may be found between
things of the same order, but not between a cause and that which is
caused.” For, we say that a statue is like a man, but not conversely; so
also a creature can be spoken of as in some sort like God; but not that
God is like a creature.7
Eckhart seems to exploit the poles of this one-sided relation in an extreme
manner that results in a significant divergence from Thomas’s theology. In
what follows I will first clarify one pole of this assertion, namely that God as
understanding or intellect is radically different from his creation.8 Then I
will deal with the second pole of the assertion, namely the strict unity
between creation and God (being as God) which results in what I will call a
relation of “asymmetric identity” between creatures and God.
A.1. The primacy of Intellect: Deus est Intelligere The main thesis of
the Parisian Questions is that God does not think because He is, but He is
5. Sermon 9 following J. Quint’s numbering in the edition of the German works
as translated by M. O’C. Walshe, Meister Eckhart Sermons & Treatises, Vols. I & II,
(Element Books, 1987). Henceforth W.I and II: W.II. p. 151.
6. The Book of “Benedictus,” trans. E. Colledge, from B. McGinn and E. Colledge:
Meister Eckhart. The Essential Sermons, Commentaries, Treatises, and Defense Classics of
Western Spirituality (New York: Paulist Press, 1981). Henceforth: McGinn I. p. 210.
7. ST I.4.3 ad 3, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, 5 vols.
(Westminster, Christian Classics, Md.: 1981). See also ST I.13.7.
8. It is notoriously difficult to translate accurately the medieval concepts intel-
ligere and intellectus. It is little comfort that the confusion dates from the Middle Ages
themselves; to give a well-known example: the Augustinian intellectus, voluntas, and
memoria were understood by Peter Lombard to refer to faculties—an interpretation
rejected by Thomas in the Summa (ST I.93.7 ad 3). Eckhart describes God in terms
of intelligere or intellectus without any significant differences, which seems to indicate
that he too prefers a more dynamic reading, such as “understanding”: “natura Dei
est intellectus, et sibi esse est intelligere.” (Comm. Gen. no. 11). On the other hand,
it cannot be denied that he attributes Aristotelian characteristics to man’s intellectus
which, he argues, it shares with God (see n.14).
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because He thinks. Although Eckhart does not deny that understanding is a
form of existence, he claims that understanding is superior to existence and
belongs to a different order.9 The Meister refers to the Prologue to John’s
Gospel (“In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was God”; John does
not say “being”) and the fourth proposition of the Book of Causes which says
that the first of created things is being.10 In short, God is intellect or under-
standing, not being or existence (non ens vel esse). He is uncreated under-
standing beyond being, the foundation of being.
Furthermore, a cause has to differ essentially from its effect, for if it did
not it would not make sense to speak of cause and effect (they would be
essentially the same).11 Seeing that God is the cause of creation, that is, of
being, there cannot be any being (createdness) in God: “Nothing is for-
mally in both a cause and its effect if the cause is a true cause. Now God is
the cause of all existence. It follows that existence is not formally present in
God.”12 Certainly, this safeguards God’s transcendence, but the relation
between God and creatures appears to become problematic, although we
need to make an important qualification, namely with respect to the rela-
tion between God and man.
Aristotle had argued in Book III of De Anima that for thinking to
occur the intellect has to be universal, separated from matter and incor-
poreal.13 These characteristics it shares with God. Thus, the metaphysical
statement that God is intellect has both epistemological connections (in-
determinate thinking can think the forms of all determinate things) and
spiritual significance: the intellect has nothing in common with created
beings. Man, insofar as he is intellect, is therefore indistinguishable from
God. This explains Eckhart’s intellectualism, which represents both a
continuation and a radicalization of Thomas’s. This isomorphy between
the divine and the human intellect is therefore the foundation of our
deification:
From what has been said you can understand the way in which one
“who adheres to God is one spirit” (1Cor. 6:17). Intellect properly
belongs to God, and “God is one.” Therefore, anything has as much of
God and the One and of “One-Existence” with God as it has of intellect
and what is intellectual. For God is one intellect and intellect is one.
Nowhere and never do we find God as God save in intellect. . . . Rise
9. A. Maurer, Master Eckhart. Parisian Questions and Prologues (Toronto: Pon-
tifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1974), p. 46.
10. “The first of created things is being, and there is nothing else created
before it.” For an English translation of Liber de Causis: The Book of Causes, trans. from
the Latin with intro. by D. J. Brand (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1984).
11. Par. Quest. 2.10.
12. Par. Quest. 1.8; A. Maurer, Master Eckhart, p. 48.
13. De Anima, 429a 24–25. The mind is unmixed not only with body but with
any form whatsoever, in order that, having no character of its own, it can take on
the forms without distortion in the act of thinking.
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up then to intellect; to be attached to it is to be united to God. To be
united, to be one, is to be one with God.14
The human intellect is the only avenue open to man to attain to the
Otherness of God. Below we will investigate the nature of the intellect and
its relation to God in more detail (“the spark of the soul”), but first we need
to explore the other pole in Eckhart’s thought, namely the dependence of
creatures on God.
A.2. Esse Deus est According to the Parisian Questions, creatures re-
ceive their being from God, who is himself beyond being, as thought, for
there is no essential connection between cause and effect (a Neoplatonic
principle which will be compared below with Thomas’s treatment of the
same subject). With such a notion of causality, Eckhart is able to argue that
insofar as creatures have being, God is not, or, insofar as God is, creatures are
nothing. The latter is a recurring statement in the German works and was
condemned by the papal bull “In agro domenico” (1329).
In the Three-Part Work, Eckhart argues that being is God. This has
sometimes been interpreted as “God is being,” a widespread assertion in the
Middle Ages, and one that Eckhart himself makes on numerous occasions.
Understood in this way, it could be argued that there is no contradiction
between saying that God is intellect and God is being, for in the latter case
God’s being is clearly distinguished from created being: esse indistinctum, esse
simpliciter versus esse hoc et hoc, esse formaliter inhaerens (if God is being,
creatures are nothing, and vice versa).15 Throughout the Latin and German
works there can be found a multitude of references to God as undifferenti-
ated existence, qualified by frequent appearances of texts asserting that
God is in some way beyond esse.16 However, O. Davies, following a suggestion
by Karl Albert, has pointed out that Esse est Deus is a statement of predication
and not of identity: it should therefore be distinguished from the phrase
“God is being.”17 If this view is correct, Eckhart is asserting something about
creation, and in particular, its radical dependence on God. Apart from God,
creatures are absolutely nothing, and therefore, whatever perfections they
have, they have from God:
All creatures are pure nothing. I do not say they are a trifle or they are
anything: they are pure nothing. What has no being, is not. All crea-
tures have no being for their being consists in the presence of God.18
14. Sermon XXIX, no. 304, B. McGinn, ed. with collaboration of F. Tobin and
E. Borgstadt, Meister Eckhart Teacher and Preacher. Classics of Western Spirituality (New
York: Paulist Press, 1986). Henceforth, McGinn II p. 226.
15. See B. McGinn’s “Theological Summary” of Eckhart’s theology in McGinn
I, p. 33.
16. McGinn I p. 32 plus refs. p. 300 n. 44–45.
17. O. Davies, Meister Eckhart. Mystical Theologian (London: SPCK, 1992), p.
108, following K. Albert, Meister Eckharts These vom Sein: Untersuchingen zur Metaphysik
des Opus Tripartitum (Saarbrücken: Universitäts-und Schulbuchverlag, 1976), p. 38.
18. Sermon 4, W.I, p. 284.
MEISTER ECKHART AND JAN VAN RUUSBROEC: A COMPARISON 161
In his Second Lecture on Ecclesiasticus, Eckhart, commenting on Si.24:29,
observes that every being, in that it is empty in and of itself, thirsts for and
desires existence itself; it is more proper to say that something continually
receives existence rather than that it has existence itself in a fixed way. He
illustrates his meaning by referring to light and heat in a medium: while
heat takes root in the medium and remains fixed after the sun has set, light
does not and departs from the air when the sun has gone down, “because
it has not the slightest root in the form it accompanies, but only a thirst or
appetite.”19 This comparison illustrates the radical dependence of the crea-
ture on God, namely that
what it possesses it does not have from itself as something that inheres
in it, but that it has begged it and received it as something that is
continually on loan. It has it in passing, as a reception, and not like a
received quality given by its superior cause.20
This sort of language has led O. Davies to argue that this second
approach (being is God) entails univocal usage of terms as applied to God
and creation. Seeing that creatures are nothing in themselves, their perfec-
tions are really God’s perfections (with the proviso that in God they are
actualized in an infinite manner) and predication of them is therefore
univocal:
The clear statement that “being is God” indicates that Eckhart’s appli-
cation of the word ‘being’ to both God and creatures is univocal (has
the same meaning), and that the distinction between God and his
creation is maintained by the fact that the being of God is infinite while
that of creatures is finite and particular. This is thoroughly consistent
with the inquantum principle of Eckhart’s theory of analogy.21
Although it can be doubted whether it is justifiable to call the applica-
tion of “being” to both God and creatures “univocal,” if it is granted that
being in God is infinite and simple, while in creatures it is finite and
particular, there appear to be sufficient passages in support of such an
interpretation, especially those where Eckhart draws a close parallel be-
tween the generation of the Son and creation (and the “generation” of the
just man in particular).22 In the Parisian Questions it was argued that God is
beyond being because cause and effect have to differ essentially. However,
it is not because the Cause differs essentially from its effects that therefore
the effects cannot be similar (or even identical, according to some of
Eckhart’s most radical assertions) to their Cause. We could call this “asym-
metric identity” between creation and God. On numerous occasions Eck-
19. Comm. Ecc. no. 46, McGinn II, pp. 175–176.
20. Par. Gen. no. 25, McGinn I, p. 103.
21. Davies, Meister Eckhart, p. 109.
22. See n.61 and the quotation in the main text.
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hart emphasizes this one-sided dependence of creatures on God: “a supe-
rior in itself always affects its inferior and, vice versa, is in no way affected
by it,”23 while in Sermon 71 we read: “God flows into all creatures, and yet
remains untouched by them all. He has no need of them.”24 Elsewhere he
uses a famous illustration, speaking of the deified soul: “If you were to cast
a drop into the ocean, the drop would become the ocean, not the ocean
the drop.”25
Esse Deus est and similar statements say something about creation’s radi-
cal dependence on God and not about God as such and need therefore to be
distinguished from statements like Deus est intelligere or Deus est esse (absolu-
tum). Once this different perspective is grasped, it will become clear how
Eckhart can consistently affirm that man is good in the same way as God is
good, and yet claim that calling God good is an injustice. “Being is God”
implies that being does not exhaust (the concept of) God; therefore, it is not
incompatible to say that God is intellect or understanding.26 Whereas in the
Parisian Questions the position that God is intellect was argued on the basis of
a notion of essential dissimilarity between cause and effect, saying that “being
is God” does not contradict this notion of causality, for God transcends being,
while at the same time bestowing it upon creatures who are nothing in
themselves without this continual gift. In short, Deus est intelligere (and there-
fore not particular being) says something about the transcendent God, while
Esse est Deus says something about creatures and their dependence on God.
When Eckhart calls God being,27 he is careful to indicate the difference
between God as absolute being and creaturely or particular being: esse absolu-
tum versus esse formaliter inhaerens.28
Eckhart’s distinctive use of analogy hints at the same dynamic of asym-
metric identity as becomes clear from an oft-misunderstood passage:
Being or existence and every perfection, especially general ones such
as existence, oneness, truth, goodness, light, justice, and so forth are
used to describe God in an analogical way. It follows from this that
goodness and justice and the like (in creatures) have their goodness
totally from something outside to which they are analogically ordered,
namely God. . . . Analogates have nothing of the form according to
which they are analogically ordered rooted in positive fashion in them-
selves. But every created being is analogically ordered to God in exist-
23. Comm.Wis. no. 39, McGinn II p. 155. A similar passage is to be found in
Comm. Jn. no. 555 where Eckhart refers to Macrobius. McGinn II, p. 185.
24. Sermon 71, W.I, p. 155
25. Sermon 80, W.II, p. 323.
26. If this is a statement of predication, this implies that the predicate has a
wider range of application than the subject. One can say that Dominicans are
humans, but one cannot say that humans are Dominicans.
27. There is no reason to consider this “an emphatic inversion,” (Davies,
Meister Eckhart, referring to K. Albert, p. 122 n.22.)
28. McGinn I, p. 33.
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ence, truth and goodness. Therefore every created being radically and
positively possesses existence, life and wisdom from and in God, not in
itself as a created being.29
Unlike some commentators who hold the view that Eckhart argues here for
the radical gulf between creatures and God—according to Tobin, it would
be a case of “extrinsic analogy”—I think it is safe to assume that Eckhart
stresses  here the radical dependence of creatures on God (identity of
creaturely and divine perfections): the perfections creatures have are divine
perfections, for in themselves creatures have nothing—whatever they have
they have from God:
the one and the same health that is in the animal [the perfections that
exist in God] is that (and no other) which is in the diet and the urine
[perfections as found in creation] in such a way that there is no more
of health as health in the diet and urine than there is in a stone
[creatures do not have any perfections “of their own”].30
A closer comparison will show how Eckhart radicalizes Thomas Aqui-
nas’s position. Because Thomas emphasizes the autonomous nature of
creatures more than Eckhart who on the contrary stresses their radical
nothingness, the German Dominican has to conclude that creatures inso-
far as they “have” being, goodness etc., are God’s goodness, being. In ST
Ia.4.3  (“Whether any creature  can be  like  God”),  Aquinas  invokes his
principle of analogy: seeing that God is not contained in any genus the
effects will only distantly reproduce the form of the agent. It is interesting
to observe that Thomas, while referring to Dionysius in the reply to the
objections,31 opts for an Aristotelian principle in the corpus of the article,
namely that since every agent reproduces itself so far as it is an agent, and
everything acts according to the manner of its form, the effect must in
some way resemble the form of the agent.32 Obviously, I do not want to
suggest that Eckhart (who, as we have seen, refers to a Neoplatonic prin-
ciple to account for the [dissimilar] relation between cause and effect) is
a Neoplatonist and Thomas an Aristotelian, but I merely want to indicate
the multifarious appropriation of Neoplatonism by Eckhart and Thomas.
29. Comm.Ecc. no. 52–53, McGinn II, p. 178
30. For a different interpretation, see F. Tobin, Meister Eckhart: Thought and
Language (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1986). Davies’s comments
on this passage are helpful, pp. 103–7.
31. ST Ia.4.3 ad 4. See n.8 and the quotation of this reply in the main body of text
32. ST Ia.4.3. The fact that Thomas uses an Aristotelian principle on this
crucial issue—the relation between the Creator and his creation—should arouse
suspicion of an exclusively Neoplatonic reading of Aquina’s Summa. On the other
hand, Thomas’s indebtedness to the Neoplatonic tradition is a well-documented:
see W. J. Hankey, God in Himself: Aquinas Doctrine of God as Expounded in the Summa
Theologiae (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), and F. O’Rourke, Pseudo-
Dionysius and the Metaphysics of Aquinas. (Leiden, 1992).
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Because Thomas emphasizes the relative autonomy of creation, he is in a
position to argue that the effects resemble their Cause, whereas Eckhart
who stresses the nothingness of creatures has to conclude that creaturely
perfections are actually divine perfections—without wanting to imply that
God is similar to his creation. Thomas offers a similar correction to the
assertion that the first Cause is beyond being in his Commentary on the Book
of Causes: for Thomas “to be” is not simply the primary effect caused by
God as Creator but God’s essence, and so God’s proper name.33 Of course,
I do not want to suggest that Thomas somehow blurs the distinction be-
tween the divine being and esse commune, for he clearly distinguishes
them.34 Yet, Eckhart’s different understanding of the status of creation
results in a very different concept of analogy and, as I will explain below,
a particular theology of grace.
If the Parisian Questions emphasized the transcendence of God, and
the Opus Tripartitum his immanence, or rather the dependence of crea-
tures on God, it is revealing how Eckhart combines both perspectives: by
emphasizing God’s transcendence (esse absolutum or indistinctum) Eckhart
can at the same time stress his immanence and vice versa. In his Com-
mentary on Exodus no. 113–14 and Commentary on Wisdom no. 154–55, Eck-
hart argues that the transcendent nature of God (his indistinct character)
does not allow us to distinguish him from particular, created beings. See-
ing that one can only distinguish between things that have something in
common and God does not even have being in common with the par-
ticular beings of His world, He cannot be distinguished from them, or
rather, His indistinctive nature (esse indistinctum) itself is the way in which
He can be “distinguished” from distinctive beings (esse hoc et hoc). Thus,
if indistinction is the basis for distinction, then it follows that the more
you emphasize God’s similarity, the more you implicitly stress his dissimi-
larity and vice versa. It places Eckhart squarely in the tradition of negative
33. See the “Introduction” by V. A. Guagliardo to St. Thomas Aquinas: Commen-
tary on the Book of Causes, trans. V. A. Guagliardo, C. Hess, and R. C. Taylor,
(Washington D.C. The Catholic University Press of America Press, 1996), p. xxviii
n.6. According to Thomas, “the first cause is above being inasmuch as it is itself
infinite “to be” (esse). “Being” (ens), however, is called that which finitely participates
“to be”, and it is this which is proportioned to our intellect” (p. 51).
34. ST Ia 3.4 ad 1. Nevertheless, Thomas is more nuanced and always more mod-
erate than Eckhart when it comes to describing how God relates to His crea-
tion. Whereas Eckhart clearly states that God is completely and utterly unlike His
creation, Thomas writes it is “more fitting” to say that a creature is like God than the
converse. Likening the relation between God and His creatures to that of the sun and
its effects, he surprisingly writes: “And so the sun is said to be somewhat like those
things in which it produces its effects as an efficient cause. Yet the sun is also unlike all
these things in so far as such effects do not possess heat and the like in the same way as
they are found in the sun. So, too, God gave things all their perfections and thereby is
both like and unlike all of them” (Summa contra Gentiles I.29, trans. A. Pegis Notre
Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975), p. 138.
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theology: the more “appropriate” predications are, the less they actually
apply to God.35
The distinction between God and creatures is therefore based on the
“indistinct” character of being (esse indistinctum). Before we explore Eck-
hart’s trinitarian thought and its relation to his doctrine of creation, it is
interesting to observe that “Unum” can serve the same purpose, as we learn
from his Commentary on Wisdom (Ws. 7:27a): “the term “one” is the same as
indistinct, for all distinct things are two or more, but all indistinct things are
one. Furthermore, there is an indistinction that concerns God’s nature,
both because He is infinite and also because He is not determined by the
confines or limits of any genera or beings. But it is the nature of any created
being to be determined and limited by the fact that it is created . . . There-
fore, saying that God is one is to say that God is indistinct from all things.”36
The term “one” signifies Existence Itself in itself along with the nega-
tion and exclusion of all non-being. Unity or the One most properly be-
longs to God, even more than the terms “the True” and “the Good.”
Quoting Macrobius, Eckhart contends that it not only means that God is
one, but also that He is the only one:
The One which is called the Monad, that is, unity, is not a number, but
the source and origin of all number. . . . Since it is one, it cannot be
numbered itself; nevertheless, it creates innumerable kinds of genera
from itself and contains them within itself.37
This interchangeability of One and Existence explains a certain fluctuation
in Eckhart’s characterization of the inner ground of the Trinity. To this we
now turn. Given the purpose of this article, I can only in a rather sketchy
manner comment on the most characteristic topics such as the close con-
nection between the intratrinitarian dynamics (more in particular the gen-
eration of the Son) and God’s creative activity; the role of the redditio
completa; and the participation of the soul as intellect in this return.
A.3. Bullitio and Ebullitio: Negative anthropology and the role of the
intellect First however, we need to observe that Eckhart’s trinitarian doc-
trine is not as elaborate nor as consistent as Ruusbroec’s. For instance, two
main patterns can be discerned in his trinitarian thought, one according to
which the Godhead is identified with Esse, and the Father, Son, and Spirit
with Unum, Verum, and Bonum; another, less predominant, attributes Unum
35. D. Turner’s excellent study, The Darkness of God. Negativity in Christian
Mysticism (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995), argues this point ele-
gantly. Eckhart’s assertions of indistinction are therefore innocuous enough; more
problematic is his theory of analogy and in particular the connaturality of the
human and divine intellect which grounds those assertions.
36. Comm.Wis. no. 144, McGinn II, p. 166.
37. Comm.Wis. no. 149, McGinn II, p. 168. Eckhart quotes from Macrobius’s
Commentary on the Dream of Scipio 1.6.7.
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to the Godhead and Esse to the Father.38 Whatever pattern prevails, the
same spiritual dynamics apply, for both God’s being and his oneness imply
indistinction; just so, the soul has to become indistinguished and shun
“every particular thing that reeks of distinction.”39
Likewise, two patterns can be identified in the emanation of the Per-
sons, one according to which the power of generating in the Godhead
belongs more principally to the essence than to the relation that is Pater-
nity,40 another one, more frequent, describes the Father as the principle of
the divinity, out of which proceed the Son and the Spirit.41
The most remarkable feature of Eckhart’s trinitarian doctrine is the
close link between the generation of the Son and God’s creative act: between
bullitio—the dynamic life of the Trinity giving rise to the three divine Per-
sons—and ebullitio or creation. The emanation of the Persons in the God-
head is the prior ground of creation.42 In his Commentary on Genesis this close
relation between bullitio and ebullitio is clarified by a reference to Psalm 61:12:
the “beginning” in which “God created heaven and earth” is the first
simple now of eternity. I say that it is the very same now in which God
exists from eternity, in which also the emanation of divine Persons
eternally is, was and will be. . . . It is false to picture God as if he were
waiting around for some future moment in which to create the world.
In the one and the same time in which he was God and in which he
begot his coeternal Son as God equal to himself in all things, he also
created the world. “God speaks once and for all.” (Job 22:14) He speaks
in begetting the Son because the Son is the World; he speaks in creating
creatures. . . . This is why it says . . . : “God has spoken once and for all
and I have heard two things.”43
Only occasionally Eckhart specifies obvious differences between bullitio and
ebullitio: bullitio is not directed towards what is outside the producer, it does
38. McGinn I, p. 35. Although Esse and Unum are the terms most frequently
predicated of the divine ground, Eckhart sometimes states that intellect preemi-
nently belongs to the hidden Godhead, not only in the Par. Quest. but also in Sermon
9: “When we receive God in being, we receive him in his forecourt, for being is the
forecourt of his dwelling. Where is He then in his temple, where He shines in
holiness? Intellect is the temple of God” (W.II, p. 152).
39. Comm.Wis. no. 282, McGinn II, p. 172
40. Comm.Jn. no. 43, McGinn I p. 38 refers to ST I.41.5.
41. Par.Gen. no. 12. Another clear example is to be found in Sermon 15: “The
Father is the beginning of the Godhead, for He comprehends himself in himself.
From him comes forth the eternal Word, yet remaining within, and the Holy Ghost
proceeds from both, yet remains within and the Father does not give birth to him,
for He is the end of the Godhead, indwelling in it and in all creatures, and there is
pure repose and a resting of all that ever obtained being” (W.II p. 53). The second
pattern, more frequent according to B. McGinn, seems to qualify the traditional
criticism of Eckhart’s notion of a Godhead beyond the Persons.
42. Comm.Ex. no. 16, McGinn II, p. 46
43. Comm. Gen. no. 7, McGinn I, p.85.
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not proceed from something particular or from nothing, nor is it directed
towards particular existence; in short, it does not produce effects. Further,
what proceeds from what is one insofar as it is one, is always one, while what
proceeds outside the One necessarily falls into plurality and division.44
Another distinctive feature of Eckhart’s trinitarian thought and one of
considerable importance for our purpose of comparing it with Ruusbroec’s
is the role the redditio completa (the return of the Intelligible Principle upon
itself) occupies. This Neoplatonic principle taken from the Book of Causes
(prop. 15), had been referred to by Aquinas when he treated of God’s
self-knowledge (ST I.14.2 ad 1). Thomas applies it to God who knows His
essence (and all other things) directly through Himself, while the human
intellect has to turn to phantasms to acquire knowledge (ST I. 84.7): it does
not know itself by its essence but by its act (ST I.87.1). Eckhart uses it in a
quite different context, not so much to explain God’s (self-) knowledge, but
to account for the “flowing back” of the Son into the Father: “The first
outburst and the first effusion God runs out into is his fusion into the Son,
who flows back into the Father.”45 Even more remarkable is that the soul as
intellect can participate in this movement. This will be dealt with later, but
one quotation will make Eckhart’s application of the theme clear:
The Father bears his Son in eternity like himself. . . . I say more: He has
borne him in my soul. Not only is she with him and He equally with
her, but He is in her: the Father gives birth to the Son in the soul in the
very same way as He gives birth to him in eternity, and no differently.
He must do it whether He likes it or not. The Father begets his Son
unceasingly, and furthermore, I say, He begets me as his Son and the
same Son, I say even more: not only does He beget me as his Son, but
He begets me as himself and himself as me, and me as his being and
his nature.46
This notion of redditio completa as used by Eckhart will be contrasted with
the notion of regyratio, so central to the trinitarian doctrine of Ruus-
broec.47
Following the dynamic of Eckhart’s thought itself we have progressed
from a (brief) exposition of his trinitarian doctrine to the topic of the
participation of the human intellect in the intratrinitarian life. This will be
outlined in greater detail in the next section. First, I want to investigate the
nature of the intellect (the “Spark”) in greater detail, although it is impos-
44. Comm. Par.Gen. no. 9–12, McGinn I, p. 96–98
45. Sermon 35, W.I, p. 249. A more elaborate reference can be found in Comm.
Ex. no. 16, 74.
46. Sermon 6, W.II, p. 134–35.
47. The notion of regyratio seems to have been anticipated by the beguine
Hadewijch (c. 1210–1260), but the manner in which Ruusbroec develops it is highly
original.
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sible to define it. The negative theology that pervades Eckhart’s works is
reflected in a negative anthropology that is closely connected with it. The
ineffability of the divine ground results in a parallel ineffability of the
“spark” of the soul which is one with it: “God, who has no name—He has
no name—is ineffable, and the soul in her ground is also ineffable, as He
is ineffable.”48 The spark is “uncreated,”49 neither ‘this’ nor ‘that’, “free of
all names and avoid of all forms, entirely exempt and free, as God is exempt
and free in himself.”50
The theme of the Spark is closely related to that of the Birth of the Son
in the soul. B. McGinn explains:
Since the Father gives birth to the Son in eternity, and since there can
be no temporal dimension in God, He is always giving birth to the Son;
and since God’s ground is one with the soul’s ground, the eternal
Father must always be giving birth to the Son within the ground of the
soul.51
When cataloguing the various passages where the Birth is discussed, one
notices a certain inconsistency in terminology specifying the “place” where
the Birth occurs, but it is clear that it is intimately connected with man’s
ability to know.52 In Sermon 2, for instance, Eckhart “situates” the Birth in
the intellect, but above the powers of intellect and will is the “citadel” of the
soul, in which even God cannot see inside unless He “leaves outside” all his
divine names and personal properties. Just as the Godhead hovers beyond
the Persons, so too the ground of the soul is beyond the powers.53 In other
Sermons the birth takes place in the spark, but this presents us with the
difficulty of the relation between intellect and the ground of the soul.
Despite some minor inconsistencies, Eckhart’s thought on this matter is
rather clear: because of the connaturality of the divine ground and the
essence of the soul, which is very much intellectual in nature, man can
become deiform.
One of the most convincing texts in which the intellect is characterized
as the main power that reaches into the divine ground is Sermon 69. Accord-
ing to this text, the intellect has five properties: it is detached from here and
now; it is like nothing, just like God is like nothing; it is pure and uncom-
pounded; it is ever inwardly seeking, allured by God’s being that “ever
abides in the innermost”; and finally, it is an image, indistinguishable from
God’s Image.54 The intellect “bursts into the ground whence goodness and
truth proceed, and seizes it in principio, in the beginning where goodness
48. Sermon 17, W.I, p. 172.
49. Sermon 13, W.I, p. 190.
50. Sermon 2, W.I, p. 76.
51. McGinn I, p. 51.
52. Tobin, Meister Eckhart, pp. 126–27.
53. Sermon 2, W.I, p. 71–78.
54. Sermon 69, W.I, p. 296–97.
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and truth are just coming out, before it has any name, before it burgeons
forth.” Whereas the will is satisfied with God as He is good, the “intellect
strips all this off and enters in and breaks through to the roots, where the
Son wells up and the Holy Ghost blossoms forth.”55 In short, there can be
no doubt about the privileged status of the intellect and the intellectual
nature of the “spark.”56
B. Meister Eckhart’s Theology of the Image
To clarify the foregoing outline we will now focus on the use of image in the
writings of Eckhart. This allows us to recapitulate and illustrate much of the
ground already covered and will also provide us with a point of departure
from which we can compare the Meister’s thought with that of Ruusbroec.
We will also raise the crucial question whether Eckhart’s view can be recon-
ciled with a theology of grace. A brief consideration of Eckhart’s spiritual
goal, namely detachment, concludes this section.
One of the main differences between Eckhart’s and Ruusbroec’s
theology is the way they interpret Genesis 1:26. Eckhart’s tendency to draw
a close parallel between the generation of the Son within the Trinity and
God’s creative act is especially noticeable in the case of man, who is created
in God’s Image. The language in which he describes the generation of the
Son, the Father’s Image, and the soul as image is often identical.
Eckhart’s  thought  seems open  to a  radical  and a  more  moderate
interpretation, for at times he characterizes the soul as “made to the image,”
while at other times the soul itself is the image of God.57 These two positions
do not have to exclude each other: it is not because the soul is created as
an image of God that it therefore cannot be to the Image of God. Such a
benign interpretation presupposes that one can distinguish between the
soul as image and the Word as Image, but it is exactly this distinction that
Eckhart rejects in his more radical Sermons. Ruusbroec, on the other hand,
allows for a close union between our uncreated life in the Son (as divine
idea) and our created life but he is careful to indicate that such a close
union never becomes an ontological identity. For the same reason (union
implies non-identity) Ruusbroec can give prominence to the role of grace
in man’s re-creation, while Eckhart’s position on this issue is rather ambiva-
lent as will become clear throughout this section. In what follows we will
55. Sermon 69, W.I, p. 297.
56. Sermon 76: “The soul has something in her, a spark of intellect, that never
dies; and in this spark, as at the apex of the mind we place the ‘image’ of the soul”
(W.I, p. 64).
57. For some examples of the soul as “imago Dei”: Comm. Jn no. 84, McGinn
I, p. 153; Par Gen. no. 140, McGinn I, p. 110; Benedictus 2, McGinn I, p. 243; Sermon
83, W.II, p. 332. “Ad imaginem”: Comm.Jn no. 123, McGinn I, p. 170; Par.Gen. no.
138, 143, 154, McGinn I, p. 109, 112, 117; Comm. Wis. no. 283, McGinn II, p. 172.
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discuss some main passages from their writings without attempting to be
exhaustive.
Sermon XLIX offers a good starting point to explore Eckhart’s Image-
theology. In it he makes two introductory points: first, the image is to be
found in the apex of the soul which is as we have noted earlier, intellectual
in nature; second, he adds that “an image as such cannot be separated from
that of which it is an image, even by the intellect.”58 How close Eckhart sees
this union is hinted at in the next quotation, in which the perspective shifts
from the generation of the Son to the manner in which the just man
depends on Justice. After Eckhart has argued in a general way that first, an
image has to be similar (one is similar to God when one is assimilated to no
creature), more in particular in nature and species; that, third, equality
belongs to  the  perfection of  the image; fourth,  that the  image  is the
expression of its source; and, fifth, that everything that is alien or other is
outside the notion of the image, he then continues:
From the fifth and second points above it follows that the image and its
exemplar are not separately numbered as two substances, but the one
is in the other. “I am in the Father, and the Father is in me.” (Jn. 14:11)
Furthermore, the just person depends on Justice formally, not like
something from outside oneself, different and alien. This is the sixth
property of the image.59
This immediate transition from the consubstantiality from the Father and
Son to the connection between Justice and the just man illustrates Eckhart’s
tendency to identify both. Eckhart’s emphasis on the connaturality of the
divine and human intellect seems to suggest that he has more in mind than
the mere idea that God and soul cannot be distinguished because of the
transcendent nature of God in relation to His creation.
Moreover, man’s return to its primal source is based on the “complete
return” of the divine  intellectual  nature upon  itself. This  Neoplatonic
principle, already referred to, underpins the re-creation of man who shares
God’s nature insofar as man is intellect:
Seventh, it is consequently necessary that the image be found only in
intellectual nature where the same reality returns to itself in a “perfect
return,” and where the one that gives birth is one and the same with
the child or offspring, finding oneself in the other and the other in
oneself.60
58. Sermon XLIX, no. 505, McGinn II, pp. 234–35.
59. Sermon XLIX, no. 510, McGinn II, p. 236.
60. Sermon XLIX, no. 510.
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This metaphysical principle throws light on some of Eckhart’s most daring
statements in the German Sermons.
In the Commentary on John, Eckhart again describes the “generation” of
the just man in the same language as the generation of the Son from the
Father. The just man, insofar as he is just shares the nature of justice
univocally:
The just man proceeds from and is begotten by justice and by that very
fact is distinguished from it. Nothing can beget itself. Nonetheless, the
just man is not different in nature from justice, both because “just”
signifies only justice, just as “white” signifies only the quality of white-
ness, and because justice would make no one just if its nature changed
from one place to another, just as whiteness does not make a man black
or grammar make him musical. From this it is clear . . . that the just
man is the offspring and son of justice. One is called a son in that one
becomes other in person, not other in nature. “The Father and I are
one.” (Jn. 10:30)—we are distinct in person, because nothing gives
birth to itself; we are one in nature, because otherwise justice would
not beget the just man, nor would the Father beget the Son who
became other in person, nor would generation be univocal. . . . If the
Father and the Son, justice and the just man, are one and the same in
nature, it follows . . . that the just man is equal to justice, not less than
it, nor is the Son less than the Father.61
The nothingness of creatures is itself the foundation for this daring identi-
fication: “the just man or just thing in itself is dark and does not shine. It
shines in justice itself, its principle, and justice shines in the just man.” At
the same time, Eckhart emphasizes that justice is not only in every just man,
but also “entire outside every just man and thing.”62 All this seems to
confirm our earlier interpretation: creatures are similar, if not identical to
God insofar as their perfections are from him, and yet God is radically
different from his creation.
Can we interpret Eckhart’s statements concerning the birth of the Son
in man, the image and the just man in the light of a theology of grace? This is
the approach that E. H. Wéber puts forward in a stimulating article.63 Wéber
argues that the whole of Eckhart’s theology can only be properly understood
as referring to the effects of the infusion of the uncreated gift of grace in
61. Comm. Jn. no.16–17, McGinn I, p. 127.
62. Comm. Jn. no. 22; See also no. 12: “The word, Logos or idea of things exist
in such a way and so completely in each of them that it nevertheless exists entire
outside each. It is entirely within and entirely without” (McGinn I p. 126). In what
follows (no. 23–27), Eckhart elaborates on the theme of imago Dei to clarify further
the dependence of the just man on justice, in a passage similar to that of Sermon
XLIX.
63. E. H. Wéber, “La théologie de la grâce chez Maître Eckhart,” Revue des
sciences religieuses 70 (1996): 48–72.
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man. This seems an attractive option for it would allow us to situate Eckhart’s
often hyperbolic statements within an orthodox framework. However, Wéber
(who mainly focuses on the Latin works) presupposes that it is meaningful to
distinguish between man’s created being and God’s being—but it is just this
distinction that Eckhart rejects in his most radical Sermons. If creatures are
nothing, it is meaningful to state that for Eckhart everything is part of God’s
gracing activity; but it is equally meaningful to state that Eckhart does not
have room for a distinct theology of grace.
Thus, not only does Eckhart often obscure the traditional distinction
between the intratrinitarian processions (and more in particular the gen-
eration of the Son) or bullitio and God’s creative activity or ebullitio, despite
some occasional nuances;64 more importantly, he also obfuscates the dis-
tinction between God’s creative and re-creative activity. The point is not that
he considers creation itself a grace—an orthodox enough point of
view—but that God’s gracing activity appears to become “naturalised.” For
example, in Sermon XXV (no. 262) grace is described as “a kind of boiling
over” of the birth of the Son—exactly the sort of language that he uses
elsewhere to describe creation (cf. Sermon XLIX no. 511). In several places
Eckhart affirms the non-distinguishability of the divine ground and the
soul’s ground, of the birth within the Trinity and the birth within the soul.65
To see the latter as a metaphor for God’s gracing activity is not unproblem-
atic, for the former is a natural process “without the cooperation of the will,
but rather with its concomitant activity.”66 The root of the problem seems
to be, on the one hand, the close parallel between the generation of the
Son within the Trinity and within the soul67 and, on the other hand—but
closely linked to it—the connaturality between God as intellect and man as
intellect or, in more theological language, the fact that there is no distinc-
tion between the Son as Image of the Father and the image in man.68 Again,
statements of non-distinction are not problematic as such but rather the
connaturality between God and soul on which they are founded. It is not
without significance that Eckhart’s Christology and above all his sacramen-
64. Comm. Par. Gen. 9–12; cf n.44 above.
65. Sermon 4: “The Father begets his Son in the eternal intellect, and thus the
Father begets his Son in the soul just as He does in his own nature, and begets him
in the soul as her own, and his being depends on his bringing his Son to birth in
the soul, whether He would or no” (W.I, p. 285).
66. Sermon XLIX no. 511; also no. 512, McGinn II, p. 237. The fact that God
is forced to pour himself into the detached man (Sermon 14) seems also at odds with
the nature of grace.
67. Sermon Pf. 1: “And thus God the Father gives birth to his Son in the true
unity of the divine nature. See, it is like this and in no other way that God the Father
gives birth to the Son in the ground and essence of the soul, and thus unites himself
with her” (W.I, p. 5).
68. Sermon 69: “Image and image are so fully one and joined that no difference
can be discerned . . . God in his omnipotence can understand no difference
between them, for they are born together and die together.” (W.I, p. 298).
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tal theology can at the best only be qualified as underdeveloped. The soul’s
ground is one with God’s ground and participates in the redditio completa of
this intellectual nature upon itself. The unity of the divine ground with the
soul’s ground, the connaturality of the divine and human intellect, the
supra-temporal act of creation and the close parallelism between the Birth
of the Son from the Father within the Trinity and the Birth of the Son in
man appears to reduce the relevance of the historical Incarnation and the
role of grace in general.
Without wanting to minimize these difficulties, I would like to present
a lenient interpretation of Eckhart’s teaching on grace so as to avoid a
simplistic contrast with the more balanced teaching of Ruusbroec.  Al-
though grace is sometimes characterized rather generally as everything we
receive freely, undeserving though we be, Eckhart does occasionally distin-
guish between “grace freely given” (gratia gratis data) and “sanctifying grace”
(gratia gratum faciens).69 However, he understands this traditional distinction
in a manner which diverges from both Aquinas and Bonaventure since he
identifies the first with the gift of creation and the second with the grace of
salvation.70 Grace “freely given” is “common to all creatures,” while “saving
grace” is “proper only to intellective and good creatures.” The following
citation illustrates a close association between the theme of the Birth and
grace although it also suggests they are not identical:
God’s chief aim is giving birth. He is never content till He begets his Son
in us. And the soul, too, is in no way content until the Son of God is born
in her. And from that there springs forth grace. Grace is thereby infused.
Grace does not work: its work is its becoming. It flows out of God’s
essence and flows into the essence of the soul and not into her powers.71
It seems that grace, infused by the Birth, is the medium that allows man
to become one with the Son. Grace thus occupies only an intermediate
position. In Sermon 70, after Eckhart has said that the light of the intellect
is little compared to the light of grace, he states:
Yet the light of grace, great as it is, is little indeed compared with the
divine light. . . . As long as we are growing in grace, it is grace and it is
69. Comm.Wis. no. 272–73. Tobin Meister Eckhart, p. 107.
70. Sermon XXV no. 258, McGinn II, p. 218 and p. 222 n.16. In Brevil. V.2.2
gratia gratum faciens refers to grace that renders our actions meritorious; gratia gratis
data however refers to the particular assistance which helps the soul prepare itself
for receiving the gift of the Holy Spirit and not to the grace of creation. In ST
I.II.111.1, Aquinas calls sanctifying grace the grace whereby man is united to God,
while  gratuitous grace refers to  the grace whereby one man co-operates with
another in leading him to God. Bonaventure is also familiar with this understanding
of grace. See II Sent. d.27, a.1 q.1. ad 2.
71. Sermon 11, W.II, p.157. The idea that grace is bestowed upon the soul’s
essence and not in its powers was shared by Thomas, and later, by Ruusbroec.
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little, and in it we see God from afar. But when grace is perfected in the
highest, it is not grace: it is a divine light in which one sees God.72
The mediating character of  grace  is also evident in the  following
quotation. Speaking of “something in the soul in which God is bare,” he
writes:
One master says that this thing is so present to God that it can never
turn away from God and God is always present to it. I say that God has
always been in it, eternally and uninterruptedly, and for man to be one
with God in this requires no grace, for grace is a created thing, and no
creature has any business there: for in the ground of divine being, where
the three Persons are one being, she (5 the soul) is one according to
the ground.73
Grace is thus the created means by which we receive the divine life, but it is
not a share in the divine life itself.74 Because of the connaturality between
God as intellect and the human intellect grace can only be a mediating
factor:
The same knowing in which God knows himself is the knowing of every
detached spirit, and no other. The soul takes her being immediately
from God: therefore God is nearer to the soul than she is to herself,
and therefore God is the ground of the soul with all his Godhead.75
In short, Eckhart occasionally allocates an intermediary role to grace in
man’s deification; however, the connaturality between divine and human
intellect is the true foundation of the union between God and man.
Furthermore,  traditional teaching can  sometimes  be found  in the
Meister’s works, for example in Sermon 46 in which Eckhart admonishes his
listeners to abandon their particularity and to attain to their universal
human nature which was transformed (überbildet) through the Incarnation
of the Word. Here Eckhart notes that the eternal Word did not assume a
particular human person, rather He assumed a free undivided bare human
nature that was not yet particularized:
But since this very nature wherein you take yourselves has become the
Son of the eternal Father by the assumption of the eternal Word, thus
you, with Christ, become the Son of the eternal Father by reason of
72. Sermon 70, W.I, p. 289–90. In Sermon 21 Eckhart compares grace and
beatitude to the blossom and the fruit.
73. Sermon 24, W.II, p. 313.
74. Cf. Tobin, Meister Eckhart, pp. 109–11. Tobin contrasts Eckhart’s views
with those of Aquinas.
75. Sermon 10, W.II, p. 139.
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taking yourselves by that same nature which has there become God.
Beware therefore, lest you take yourselves as being either this man or
that, but take yourselves according to your free, indivisible human
nature.76
The Son took upon himself an indivisible, universal human nature “bare
and without image,” and hence the Father’s Image became the image of
human nature. This approach, reminiscent of the so-called theory of physi-
cal redemption is more attractive, if only because there is no necessary link
with the “natural” generation of the Son within the Trinity and thus it allows
room for grace: man can gradually uncover his nature redeemed in the
historical Christ through grace and works. Moreover, Eckhart indicates in
Sermon 1 (in contrast with other Sermons, for instance Sermon 6977) a
difference between the Word as God’s Image and the image as it exists in
man: “each image as it radiates forth, existing by itself, is not the same in all
respects as the Word. Rather, they have received the power to attain to
likeness by the grace of the same Word.”78
A charitable interpretation could therefore run along the following
lines: our intellect (the spark) is one with God and cannot be distinguished
from God’s intellect, although this does not imply that both are identical:
our ground is identical with God’s ground (inquantum principle), but not vice
versa (asymmetric identity). Man has to actualize this divinity within through
grace. The birth is both a natural datum, hidden from sinful man and the
graceful necessary condition to achieve union with the Godhead. This ex-
plains why grace has only  a  provisional,  intermediate  character.79 The
reader ought to decide whether such a benign interpretation suffices to
solve the tensions and ambiguities in Eckhart’s thought.
We have seen that Eckhart characterizes God as intellect, as being, or
as nothing (when we attribute being to creatures). The outline of his
spiritual ideal, detachment will vary accordingly. In one major German text,
we find that detachment
draws a man into purity, and from purity into simplicity, and from
simplicity into unchangeability, and these things produce an equality
between God and the man; and the equality must come about in grace,
76. Sermon 46, W.II, pp. 27–28. Compare Sermon 67, W.II, p. 176.
77. See n.68 of this paper.
78. Sermon 1, W.I, p. 60.
79. In the Book Benedictus—Of the Nobleman, Eckhart is quite clear on the
obstructive nature of sin that hides the divine image within: “He (5 Origen) says
that God’s image, God’s Son, is in the ground of the soul as a fount of living water
(Jn. 4:14). But if anyone throws earth, which is earthly desire, on it, that impedes
and conceals it, so that we do not perceive or grow aware of it; but the fount itself
goes on living, and when they take the earth away that was thrown over it, then it
appears, and we know that it is there.” (McGinn I, p. 242; see also Comm. Jn. no.575,
McGinn II, pp. 192–93).
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for it is grace that draws a man away from all temporal things, and
makes him pure of all transient things. And you must know that to be
empty of all created things is to be full of God, and to be full of created
things is to be empty of God.80
If God is radically different from creation, man has to “let go” creatures,
which is basically an abandonment of self. Just as God seeks nothing of his
own but is free and empty in all his works, man who is one with God is
perfectly free in all his deeds; he does them for love, without why.81 Crea-
tures are a pure nothing and therefore man who seeks “something” along
with God, actually finds “nothing.”82 Because God is above being, time, and
place, man who has in his soul “a tiny drop of intellect, a little spark” can
take God “bare, when He is stripped of goodness and being.”83 In short, the
detached person is beyond temporality, place, multiplicity, particularity, and
the like, and remains unmoved by happiness or sorrow.84 Detachment does
not constitute the main spiritual ideal for the Prior of Groenendaal. To
understand why this is we have to expound his trinitarian thought in some
detail.
II. RUUSBROEC
Again, I will first give a broad outline before turning in more detail to
Ruusbroec’s theology of Image. I will explore the most dominant themes of
Ruusbroec’s trinitarian doctrine such as the primacy of the Father as prin-
ciple of the Godhead, the fecundity of the divine nature, exemplarism, and
the like, and I will point out the similarity to Bonaventure’s trinitarian
thought. I will also explore in some detail Ruusbroec’s highly original
theological contribution, namely the notion of regyratio and the role of the
Spirit in it as an active principium diligendi. His distinctive approach will be
constrasted with the view of Richard of St. Victor and Bonaventure. In the
second section of Part II, I will argue that Ruusbroec’s more traditional
image-theology differs considerably from Eckhart’s. Ruusbroec clearly dis-
tinguishes between the soul made “to the Image” and the Son as God’s
Image; between image and likeness; between God’s creative and re-creative
action; he  also puts particular emphasis on the need for grace, made
available in Christ and the sacraments, and the like.
80. On Detachment, McGinn I, p. 288.
81. Sermon 1, W.I, pp. 56–57.
82. Sermon 4, W.I, p. 284.
83. Sermon 9, W.I, pp. 152–53.
84. Sermon 10, W.II, p. 144.
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A. The Trinitarian Doctrine of Ruusbroec
The intratrinitarian life as outlined in the works of Ruusbroec can best be
characterized as a circular movement, in which on the one hand, the Father
out of his fruitful nature gives birth to his Son, from whose mutual contem-
plation the Spirit flows as a bond of love; and on the other hand, through
the Spirit the divine Persons flow back into their shared being/essence. In
the following passage, Ruusbroec outlines some of the main elements of his
thought:
The noble nature [of God] which is the principal cause of all creatures,
is fruitful; therefore it cannot remain in tranquillity in the unity of
paternity because of the stirring (gherinen) of fruitfulness, but it has to
give birth without cease to the eternal Wisdom, i.e. the Son of the
Father. The Son is always being born, has been born, and remains
unborn; yet it is one Son. Insofar as the Father contemplates the Son,
the eternal Wisdom, and all things in the same Wisdom, He is born and
is another Person than the Father. . . . Where the nature is fruitful, the
Son is in the Father and the Father in the Son; and where the Father
gives birth to his Son, the Son is from the Father. And where the Father
contemplates his Son, and all things in his Son, there He is born; and
all this is one Son.
Neither from the fruitful nature (this is paternity), nor from the fact
that the Father gives birth to his Son, does Love—this is the Holy
Spirit—flow; but because of the fact that the Son is born as another
Person, distinct from the Father, in which the Father sees him as born
and all creatures in him and with him, as the life of all things; and
because of the fact that the Son beholds the Father as fruitful and
giving birth, and himself [the Son] and all things in the Father (this is
a mutual beholding in the same fruitful nature): from this, Love, which
is the Holy Spirit and a bond between the Father and the Son and
between the Son and the Father, is brought about. With this Love the
Persons are permeated and through it they embrace and flow back into
the unity from which the Father is constantly giving birth. And when
they have flown back into the unity, there is nevertheless no rest be-
cause of the fruitfulness of the nature. This giving birth and flowing
back into unity is the work of the Trinity; thus there is threeness of
Persons and oneness of nature.85
I will attempt to expound the main thrust of Ruusbroec’s trinitarian
thought by trying to clarify this quotation. As a preliminary remark I would
like to observe that three of its most important elements—namely, the
primacy  of the Person of the Father; exemplarism and, above all, the
fecundity of the divine nature—are reminiscent of the trinitarian doctrine
85. Jan Van Ruusbroec. Werken I, Dat Rijcke der Ghelieven, pp. 1–100. ed. J. B.
Poukens (Tielt: Lannoo, 1944), p. 60. Henceforth: Rg.I.60.
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of St Bonaventure.86 In this article I cannot fully expound this similarity, but
I hope to provide sufficient evidence to support my contention that those
interpretations which include Ruusbroec in the broader tradition of the
“Rhineland Mystics,” a theological and spiritual movement which finds its
roots in the teaching of Albert the Great and other Dominicans of whom
Meister Eckhart is the most noted, are in need of revision.
Indeed, according to Bonaventure, the fruitful nature is the primary
principle in the generation of the Son. The divine nature is necessarily
self-communicative (apparently a remote Pseudo-Dionysian legacy), while
the model offered by Richard of St Victor will allow Bonaventure to move
beyond this natural emanation to explain the procession of the Spirit as an
emanation from a fecund will. While the divine nature is the primary
principle in the generation of the Son, the will is a real principle in the
spiration  of the third Person.  In short, two  emanations can  be  distin-
guished: one per modum naturae (the fecunditas naturalis of the Father is the
“cause” of the communication of the divine nature through generation)
and another per modum amoris (the fecunditas voluntatis in the Father and the
Son causes the procession of the Spirit).
The  reader  will have  observed that  in the quotation given above,
Ruusbroec identifies “paternity” with the fruitful nature. This may appear
strange (one would have expected that he would have reserved this term
for the Father-Son relation), but it illustrates that Ruusbroec firmly locates
the fruitful nature in the Father as origin of the Trinity. Indeed, the Father
is “the principle of the whole Godhead with respect to being and Persons,”87
“the eternal beginning of the Holy Trinity.”88 Ruusbroec identifies the unity
of the divine nature with the Father “because of the fruitfulness and the
origin of its eternal works.”89 It also seems to indicate, although Ruusbroec
86. Cf. G. Emery: “Ces traits majeurs de la pensée bonaventurienne . . . peu-
vent être ramenés à trois idées fondamentales: la diffusion du souverain bien, la
fécondité divine qui s’enracine dans la fontalité du Père (primauté, plénitude fon-
tale), et l’exemplarité du Fils et du Saint-Esprit à l’égard des créatures” (p. 244). “C’est
également dans ces intuitions fondamentales (fécondité et primauté, exemplarité),
davantage que par tel autre aspect particulier de son enseignement, que Bonaven-
ture se distingue d’Albert” (p. 245). (From G. Emery, La Trinité créatrice. Trinité et
création dans les commentaires aux Sentences de Thomas d’Aquin et de ses précurseurs
Albert le Grand et Bonaventure [Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1995]).
87. Jan Van Ruusbroec. Die Geestelike Brulocht. Opera Omnia, iii, Corpus Chris-
tianorum. Continuatio Mediaevalis (CCCM) ciii, Lannoo, Tielt, ed. J. Alaerts, English
trans. H. Rolfson. I will refer to this as Br., followed by the relevant book (a, b, or
c) and lines: Br. b 2067. An excellent translation of some of Ruusbroec’s main
works, including Brulocht and Spieghel, is to be found in John Ruusbroec: The Spiritual
Espousals and other works, Classics of Western Spirituality, intro. and trans J. A. Wiseman,
pref. L. Dupré, (Paulist Press, 1985). Henceforth, Wiseman.
88. Jan Van Ruusbroec. Werken II, Van den gheesteliken tabernakel, edited by P.
Stracke, 1948, Lannoo, Tielt, p. 1–365; p. 151. Henceforth: T.II.151
89. T.II.34. Elsewhere, Jan Van Ruusbroec, Werken III, Een Spieghel der Eeuwigher
Salicheit, edited by L. Reypens, (Tielt: Lannoo, 1947.) p. 129–219; p. 167. Hence-
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does not deal with this problem in a systematic manner, that the Persons are
primarily constituted per originem and not per relationes: the Father is unorigi-
nated and fruitful source of the other Persons; the Son is from the Father,
and from their mutual contemplation proceeds the Spirit. What Z. Hayes
writes  about the position of  the Father in Bonaventure’s thought  also
applies to Ruusbroec, who, as we have seen, occasionally identifies paternity
and fruitful nature:
logically prior to His full and actual paternity which is the active rela-
tion to the Son that constitutes Him as Father in the full sense, He is
Father already in an inchoative sense in as far as His personal property
of being fecund source of all others has a logical priority to any actual
emanations.90
This position has the advantage that it is not faced with the problem that,
if  the  Persons are  constituted by  relations,  and if relation  arises from
procession, the first procession logically presupposes a Person who actively
generates (which implies that the first Person is prior to the relation by
which He is said to be constituted).91
What distinguishes Bonaventure’s understanding of the generation of
the Son from that of Thomas Aquinas or Augustine, is his emphasis on
natural emanation (in this context adopting the Neoplatonic notion of
bonum diffusivum). This does not mean that the intellect is not involved, but
intellect precisely as intellect is not fecund; it is so only in as far as it springs
from the fecund nature of God. Out of inner necessity the Son flows from
the divine nature as a perfect self-expression of the Father; therefore He is
called the Word or Image.92
Likewise, Ruusbroec writes that the Father, as “a beginning without
beginning” has “perfectly comprehended himself in the ground of his
forth: Sp.III.167 we read: “Nature is fruitful, paternity and Father.” Seeing that the
divine nature can only conceptually be distinguished from the divine essence/being
in which the Persons flow back, Ruusbroec has no room for a Godhead “beyond”
the three Persons, a view that is traditionally attributed to Meister Eckhart.
90. Z. Hayes, “Introduction” to Saint Bonaventure’s Disputed Questions on the
Mystery of the Trinity, intro. and trans. Z. Hayes (New York: The Franciscan Institute,
1979), p. 39.
91. Hayes, Saint Bonaventure’s Disputed Questions p. 38. Of course, the contrast
between the two approaches (distinction of the Persons by origin or by relations) is
not absolute but rather a matter of emphasis. Bonaventure calls the Persons subsis-
tent relations, and in one place Ruusbroec writes that “the relations which consti-
tute the personal properties exist in an eternal distinction.” (Br.b1069—71)
Bonaventure also argues that the personal property of the Father is paternity, not
innascibility (I Sent. d.28 q.3): while innascibility is logically prior and lies at the root
of the personal character of the Father, it is in paternity that He finds the fulness
of his personal reality. See also, Hayes, p. 43
92. Hayes, Saint Bonaventure’s Disputed Questions, p. 45.
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fruitfulness” so that the Son has gone out as another Person in the God-
head, and “through this eternal birth all creatures have gone out eternally,
before they were created in time.”93 The Son reveals the Father, although
his nature remains always within the Father.94 Therefore, He is called the
Wisdom of God,95 his Clarity,96 Light,97 Image, and so on. I will expound
the latter attribute in greater detail in the following section.
The Spirit is seen as the Love between Father and Son, proceeding from
their mutual contemplation. He is their “bond of love.” This language
recalls that of Richard of St. Victor who as already indicated, exerted a
considerable influence on Bonaventure.98
A brief outline of their key positions will help to elucidate Ruusbroec’s
position wherein the most striking element seems to be the role he attrib-
utes to the Spirit as an active principle of regyratio.
Richard argued from an analysis of the divine essence as love to the
existence of the Trinity. When two love each other mutually there is love on
both sides (dilectio), but there is no shared love (condilectio). Shared love is
properly said to exist when a third person is loved by two Persons harmoni-
ously and in community and the affection of the two Persons is fused into
one affection by the flame of love for the third.99 This condilectio is defined
as nothing other than “the mutual coming together of intimate benevo-
lence and supreme harmony” (nisi intimae benevolentiae et summae concordiae
mutua concursio).100 Richard discerns three modalities of love within the
Trinity: amor gratuitus, found in the Father who gives without having re-
ceived; amor debitus, in the Spirit who receives all love without returning it;
and amor ex utroque permixtus, found in the Son, whose personal property it
93. Br.c, 130–32.
94. Jan Van Ruusbroec. Werken IV Vanden XII Beghinen, ed. J. Van Mierlo, Tielt:
Lannoo, 1948, p. 1–224, p. 63. Henceforth: 12B.IV.63.
95. Rg.I.73.
96. Br.b 240.
97. T.II.33.
98. Although Augustine never developed the analogy of mutual love between
human persons, there are traces in his works that hint at the idea that Richard was
to exploit, as Gonzalez has shown (e.g. De Trin. VI.§7, where it is said that the Holy
Spirit is “something common to Father and Son, whatever it is, or is their very
commonness or communion, consubstantial and coeternal. Call this friendship, if
it helps, but a better word for it is charity.” Further: “Non amplius quam tria sunt,
unus diligens eum qui de illo est, unus diligens eum de quo est, et ipsa dilectio”:
“And therefore there are not more than three; one loving him who is from him,
and one loving him from whom he is, and love itself” [transl. E. Hill, Saint Augustine:
The Trinity (New York: New City Press, 1991], p. 209–10). In De Trin. VIII.14 we find:
“Ecce tria sunt: amans et quod amatur et amor.”
99. De Trin. III.19; trans. from: Richard of St. Victor: The Twelve Patriarchs, The
Mystical Ark, Book Three of the Trinity, trans. G. A. Zinn, pref. J. Chatillon, Classics of
Western Spirituality (New York: Paulist Press, 1979), p. 392.
100. De Trin. III.19 Latin text and French translation in G. Salet, Richard de St
Victoire, La Trinité. Sources Chrétiennes (S.C.) no.63 (Paris, 1969), p. 210
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is to proceed from another and to have a Person that proceeds from him.101
(Of course, the Spirit can bestow amor gratuitus on a created person, but
obviously not in its in fullness, for it would not be appropriate to love in
such a degree that which is not worthy of this full love.)102 Because Richard
identifies these modalities of love with each of the three Persons,103 the
Spirit from whom nobody proceeds cannot share his love actively with
another Person. What, asks Richard, could the Spirit, to whom the fullness
of divine love has been communicated, return of the love He received?104
It is here that Ruusbroec parts ways with Richard (and Bonaventure),
for according to him, the Spirit is an active principle by which the divine
Persons flow back into their shared unity or essence. For Ruusbroec, it
pertains to the essence of love to return what it has received in order to
allow the other to give once again, and so forth: do ut des.
This notion of the Spirit as an active principle of the regyratio is quite
unique to Ruusbroec, and it has bearings throughout his doctrine, for
instance on his understanding of the relation between God and man, the
Incarnation, Passion and Eucharist, the gifts of the Spirit, and the like,
which have to be interpreted in the light of the bestowal of gifts by God in
order to establish a loving relationship with man in which he can recipro-
cate these gifts in a dynamic that finds its origin in the heart of the Trinity.
Thus, the Spirit is not just the “passive” Love, resulting from the mutual
contemplation of Father and Son, but it is an active principle in their
flowing back, so that the trinitarian life can be described as a circular
movement or even a whirlpool, an image especially dear to Ruusbroec.105
101. De Trin. V. 19, S.C. p. 350
102. De Trin. V.18, S.C., p. 348.
103. Oportet itaque absque dubio ut in summa simplicitate idem ipsum sit
esse quod diligere. Erit ergo unicuique trium idem ipsum persona sua quod dilectio
sua . . . Quoniam ergo quaelibet persona, ut diximus, est idem quod amor suus et
assignata  singularum discretio  constat in  solis  jam dictis tribus, sicut quartam
proprietatem sic quartam personam nullatenus ibi invenire poterimus (De Trin.
V.20, S.C. p. 352). As this quotation makes clear, Richard uses this reasoning to
argue against the thesis (attributed to and duly retracted by Gilbert of Poitiers) that
there is a “fourth entity” in the divinity.
104. De Trin. V. 18, S.C. p. 348: “Quid itaque indebiti amoris possit eis repen-
dere, a quibus constat eam omnem plenitudinem gratis accepisse? Et quoniam
proprium est ipsius . . . de se procedentem non habere, non est in divinitate cui
possit plenitudinem gratuiti amoris exhibere.”
105. Ruusbroec does not use the term regyratio—the return of the Persons into
their shared unity—as he wrote in Middle-Dutch. However, he translates it, quite ac-
curately, as wederboeghen, used as verb or substantively as in the following passage:
“Daer es de vader, met den sone ende alle die gheminde, bevaen ende behelst in
bande van minnen, dat es, in enecheit des heilechs geests. Ende dit es die selve
enecheit die vrochtbaer es na den utebroeke der persone, ende in den wederbogh-
ene i ewech bant der minnen die nemmermeer onbonden en wert” (Jan Van Ruus-
broec, Boecsken der Verclaringhe. Opera Omnia, i, CCCM ci, [Tielt: Lannoo, 1981] ed. G.
De Baere, English trans. Ph. Crowley and H. Rolfson. Henceforth, Boecksken
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Does this mean that Ruusbroec teaches that the Spirit is the originating
principle of the Love between Father and Son? The notion of the Spirit as
principium diligendi was rejected by both Aquinas and Bonaventure, and it is
illuminating to investigate the latter’s position to understand Ruusbroec’s
teaching, which does not deal with the problem explicity.106
In a passage not dissimilar to the extract from Ruusbroec quoted at the
beginning of Part II, Bonaventure writes:
Amor qui est Spiritus Sanctus non procedit a Patre in quantum amat se
nec a Filio in quantum amat se, sed in quantum unus amat alterum,
quia nexus est: ergo Spiritus Sanctus est amor, quo amans tendit in
alium: ergo est amor et ab alio et in alium et ista duo complectuntur
rationem processionis perfectae.107
Bonaventure rejects the notion that the Spirit is a bond in the active sense
as though He joined Father and Son; rather it ought to be understood in
the passive sense, namely in the sense that He proceeds from each of them.
There are therefore three ways to understand love: essential (when it refers
to the divine essence, for example, that love whereby God loves himself or
creatures, or whereby one of the divine Persons loves the others), notional
(this is the love by which the procession of the third Person becomes
known) and personal (the Spirit is the end of a perfectly liberal act of the
will found in Father and Son).108
From this we can conclude that calling the Spirit the bond of love does
not necessarily mean that He is the originating principle by which the Father
and Son love each other; on the contrary, the Spirit proceeds from their mu-
tual relation; He does not constitute it. Having said that, “once” the three Per-
sons have been constituted, Ruusbroec (as distinguished from Bonaventure)
does attribute a special role to the Spirit as an active principle of regyratio. In
followed by the relevant lines in the Middle-Dutch text: Boecksken, 378–83). A
translation by Surius (1552) of this passage, also to be found in the critical edition
(CCCM, p. 140), runs as follows: “Ibi Pater cum Filio, et cum eis electi omnes
circumplectuntur vinculo charitatis, in divina unitate: quae quidem secundum
personarum emanationem foecunda est, in earum autem reflexione sempiternus
ac insolubilis est nexus amoris.” Surius is sensitive to both the Neoplatonic (emana-
tio, reflexio) and the Richardian (nexus amoris, vinculum charitatis) vocabulary
Ruusbroec uses. This vocabulary, especially when applied to describe the intra-trini-
tarian dynamics in its out-going and in-going aspects (descibed in terms of “flowing
in” or “flowing out”) betrays  a distinct  Pseudo-Dionysian influence—in which
Augustinian  elements are then subsumed—similar  again to Bonaventure’s ap-
proach. See also the quotation at the beginning of Part II.
106. ST I.37.2 and I Sent.d.10; d.32.
107. I Sent.d.13 q.1.
108. L. Mathieu, “Introduction” to Breviloquium, partie 1. La Trinité de Dieu
(Paris: Editions Franciscaines, 1967), p. 32: Hayes, St. Bonaventure’s Disputed Ques-
tions, p. 60.
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Ruusbroec’s view, the Spirit who, to put it in Richardian language, receives
the fullness of love from the other two Persons, returns what He has received
to the other Persons of the Trinity; likewise the Spirit will give Himself to man
(Ruusbroec deals at length with the gifts of the Spirit throughout his works),
but will demand back from man whatever He has given.
After this brief outline of Ruusbroec’s trintarian doctrine, it is time to
examine his theology of the Image. In expounding it, the contrast with
Eckhart will become evident.
B. Ruusbroec’s Theology of the Image
Ruusbroec gives a relatively radical yet balanced interpretation of tradi-
tional exemplarism. We have an eternal life, before we were created in time,
in God’s Wisdom. When the almighty Father has perfectly comprehended
Himself in the ground of His fruitfulness, the Son, the eternal Word of the
Father, has gone out as a second Person in the Godhead. Through this
eternal birth all creatures have gone out from all eternity, before they were
created in time. God the Father has known the creatures in the Son, as
life-giving ideas.109 In the Son, the divine Image, all creatures have an
eternal life “without themselves.” He is the “exemplar of all creatures.”110
On the one hand, Ruusbroec stresses the strict unity between and
dependence of our created life on our eternal life in God’s Image as divine
idea. Our eternal life in God’s Image is characterized as the supra-being
(overwesen) of our created being.111 Each soul is created as a living mirror,
on which God has impressed the image of his nature.
In this way He lives imaged forth in us and we in him, for our created
life is one, without intermediary, with this image and life which we have
eternally in God. That life which we have in God is one in God, without
intermediary, for it lives in the Father with the unbegotten Son and is
begotten with the Son from the Father, flowing forth from them both
with the Holy Spirit. We thus live eternally in God and He in us, for our
created being lives in our eternal image which we have in the Son of
God. This eternal image is one with God’s wisdom and lives in our
created being.112
On the other hand, Ruusbroec stresses that, although our created being
and life are directly dependent on this image as on their eternal cause, our
created being does not become God, nor does God’s Image become a
creature, “for we are created to the image, that is created so as to receive
109. Br.c 132–33.
110. Br.b 1050.
111. Sp.III.167.
112. Sp.III.202, Wiseman, p. 237.
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the image of God, and that image is uncreated and eternal Son of God.”113
In short, Ruusbroec clearly distinguishes between our life in the Image (as
divine idea, only conceptually distinguishable from the Son)114 and our
created life to the Image. The Image refers primarily to the Son who can
also be called the image of the Trinity because He mirrors the Father, the
principle of the whole Trinity. The soul can only be called image in a
derivative sense.115
To clarify his teaching on the union between the Word and the soul,
Ruusbroec uses the metaphor of the mirror:
This image, which is the Son of God, is therefore eternal, prior to all
creation. It is to this eternal image that we have been made, for in the
most noble part of our soul—namely in the ground of our higher
powers—we have been created as a living and eternal mirror of God,
on which God has impressed his eternal image and on which no other
image can ever be impressed. This mirror remains constantly before
the face of God and therefore participates in the eternity of the image
which it has received. In this image God knew us in himself (in hem-
selven) before we were created, and now that we have been created in
time he knows us in this image as destined for himself (toe hem-selven).
This image exists essentially and personally in all persons.116
According to medieval physics the reflected image in the mirror (of man’s
soul) is not just an optical illusion but it has ontological significance: it is
real. In this case, it is the “place” where God’s eternal, creative activity and
our temporal createdness meet. Therefore Ruusbroec can say that this
mirror of the soul becomes “eternalized” through the image that it has
received or that it is “beyond time and place.”117 God and soul become
indistinguishable (the soul becomes the Brightness it receives) but they are
not ontologically identical.118
Indeed, Ruusbroec’s language seems at times similar to that of Eckhart,
especially when he links the generation of the Son to the birth of the Son
in the soul;119 there can be no doubt that “the very image of God which we
113. Sp.III.166–67, Wiseman, p.213.
114. Br.c 143.
115. Sp.III.204–5: “Even though God’s Image is in the mirror of our soul and
is united with it without intermediary, still the image is not the mirror, for God does
not become a creature. The union of the image in the mirror is, however, so great
and so noble that the soul is called the image of God.” (Wiseman p. 239)
116. Sp.III.116, Wiseman p. 213
117. Br.b 1661.
118. Br.c 76–77.
119. For instance in Sp.III.167: “It [the topmost of our soul] is therefore an
eternal and living mirror of God which ceaselessly receives the eternal birth of the
Son, who is the image of the Holy Trinity” (Wiseman, p. 214). See also Book III of
Die Geestelike Brulocht (The Spiritual Espousals).
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have received and which we bear in our soul is the son of God,” but
significantly he adds: “Nevertheless we are not God’s Wisdom, for in that
case we would have created ourselves, which is impossible and contrary to
faith, for all that we are and have comes from God and not from our-
selves.”120
The main difference between Ruusbroec and Eckhart in this respect
seems to be that according to the latter’s more audacious statements the soul
of man himself is (indistinguishable from) the Image of God (a position
argued on the basis of the connaturality of the divine and human ground,
intellectual in nature and sometimes qualified by what I called asymmetric
identity), while according to the former the Son is the Image, ontologically
clearly distinct from the soul in which He is received.121 This is an important
nuance. Eckhart used the metaphor of the image (in a general sense) to
argue for the connaturality and equality of the image and the object it images
forth; when he applies this to the soul, the distinction between the Word and
the soul as image appears to become problematic indeed.122 Ruusbroec
emphasizes the close union of Word and soul, but his metaphor of the mirror
allows him to draw a clear distinction between the (created) mirror of the
soul and the divine Image it reflects. Ruusbroec is careful to stress that,
although we have an eternal life in God, “we are not God, nor did we make
ourselves. We also did not flow forth from God by nature, rather since God
knew and willed us eternally in himself, He created us not by nature or out of
necessity, but out of the freedom of his will.”123 We are only like God which
entails a radical otherness from God that will never be transcended:
We are one life in God in our eternal Image above our createdness. . .
. Yet we remain other than God and cannot become one, and have to
remain eternally in otherness, each one in his own individuality. In this
regard God has made us (only) like himself in bare nature, according
to our higher faculties.124
Even though we are one with God, we must remain forever other than
God.125
Although the soul cannot be called the image of God, or only in a
secondary sense, it receives from its being ad imaginem three properties that
120. Sp.III.205, Wiseman, p. 239.
121. See for instance Sermon 16b: “God is here in the image without means,
and the image is without means in God. But God is in far nobler fashion in the
image than the image is in God” (W.I. p.125).
122. Cf. Sermon 16b.
123. Sp.III.201, Wiseman, p. 237.
124. 12B.IV.30.
125. Jan Van Ruusbroec. Vanden Blinkenden Steen Opera Omnia, x,. ed. G. De
Baere, Th. Mertens, and H. Noë, intro. Th. Mertens and P. Mommaers, English
trans. A. Lefevere, (Tielt: Lannoo 1991). Henceforth, St., followed by the relevant
lines: St.642–44.
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are but one in nature. The first is an essential bareness devoid of images.
Through it we are like the Father and become united with Him and His
divine nature. The second is called the higher reason of the soul in which
we receive the Son and become one with him. The third is the “spark of the
soul” (de vonke der zielen) which is the soul’s natural tendency toward its
source. Through this, we are like the Spirit, and through receiving Him we
become one spirit and love with God.126
Several interesting observations can be made: The ad imaginem (toe den
Beelde) entails a fundamental dynamic of the soul toward the divine; there-
fore Ruusbroec implicitly rejects the (static) view that the three faculties
man “possesses” reflect the divine Image; this more dynamic view is also
more congruent with his dynamic view on the inner life of the Trinity.
Second, the spark of the soul is more akin to the volitive power than to the
intellectual power, in contrast to the majority of Eckhart’s texts. Third, and
again in contrast to Eckhart, Ruusbroec pays considerable attention to the
memory as ground of the soul in the traditional Augustinian sense.
C. The Need for Grace: Redemption in Christ
Furthermore, not only does Ruusbroec differ in his understanding of the
“image” of the soul, he also puts considerable emphasis on the fact that we
are made to the likeness of God. This traditional distinction between image
and likeness finds only a marginal place in Eckhart’s thought, if any at all.
The distinction has remote Augustinian roots but the way Ruusbroec devel-
ops it seems, again, more indebted to Bonaventure.127 All creatures are
vestiges of God; only man is made to the Image, while likeness refers to
deification by the gifts of the Spirit.128 Similarly, Ruusbroec associates like-
ness always with the gift of  God’s  grace  and our  virtuous behavior in
response to it, while image has a more ontological, ‘natural’ connotation.
The Image is the Word himself, or his reflection in the mirror of the soul.
The likeness refers to God’s gifts. The image presupposes oneness, the
likeness difference; it is on the mediated, active level. Ruusbroec explains:
126. Sp.III.167–68, Wiseman, p. 214.
127. E. H. Wéber: “Il s’agit de l’ordre de la grâce, alors que le thème de
l’image de Dieu se réfère principalement à une structure de nature. Impliquant
relation avec Dieu comme objet d’opération aimante, les vertus théologales sont ici
l’élément essentiel. Par elles l’âme est réstituée à sa perfection première. . . . Il ne
s’agit plus de la façon de voir augustinienne, mais d’une conception qui est issue
d’une autre source. La doctrine bonaventurienne de la ressemblance de l’âme avec
Dieu s’enracine chez de nombreux auteurs du XIIe s. et dans les Distinctiones
d’Alain de Lille qui rattachent la fonction d’imago Dei aux principes qui constituent
la nature de l’âme et celle de similitudo Dei aux dons gratuits de la restauration”
(E. H. Wéber Dialogue et Dissensions entre St Bonaventure et St Thomas d’Aquin à Paris
(1252–1273) Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1974, pp. 93–94).
128. Breviloquium, II. 12.
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For since we are made to the likeness of God, that is, to the grace of
God—for it is a deiform light which shines through us and makes us
like (Him), and without this light which makes us like (God), we
cannot attain union supernaturally—although we cannot lose the im-
age nor the natural unity with God (die natuerlijcke eenicheit met Gode), if
we lose the likeness, that is, the grace of God, then we are damned.129
The “natural”  character of the image (as distinguished  from likeness)
explains the possibility of natural mysticism:
Because it [the eternal life] is in all of us by nature, some persons are
able to perceive it apart from grace, faith and the practice of virtue. These
are persons who have idly turned inward, above and beyond percepti-
ble images, to the bare simplicity of their being. There they think they
are holy and blessed, and some even think they are God.
This “living life” is in all of us essentially, in our bare nature, “for it is above
hope and faith, above grace and all virtuous exercises.”130 Yet on the very
next page we read that, although it is natural to all rational creatures,
no one can perceive, find or possess this life unless through love and God’s
grace he has died to himself in the living life, been baptised in the
spring, and been born again of God’s Spirit in divine freedom. He will
then always remain dwelling in God, united with him in the living life
and, through the richness and fullness of his love, will always be re-
newed and flow out with God’s grace in every virtue.131
What Ruusbroec appears to be saying is that the Image of God in us
provides a necessary and natural condition for our participation in the
trinitarian life, but it needs to be actualized through grace. Without grace,
man can enjoy the natural image in himself, but this is a futile and self-cen-
tred activity, alien to the true Christian life.
Ruusbroec is deeply aware of the fallen nature of man. Sin puts a
“screen” between the essential unity of our mind (in which God dwells) and
the faculties which can only be overcome by God’s grace, that is, in likeness:
And therefore, the sinners and the damned spirits are in darkness,
because they lack the grace of God which would enlighten and lead and
instruct them to that enjoyable unity. Yet, the essential unity of the spirit
is so noble that it cannot choose to be annihilated; but sin constitutes
129. Br.b 1683–89. Although this quotation seems to suggest that Ruusbroec
identifies grace and likeness, his more considerate teaching is that likeness (or
similitudo) is attained by grace, that is, likeness refers to man’s deiformity which is
acquired by means of faith, hope and love.
130. Sp.III.199, Wiseman, p. 235.
131. Sp.III.200, Wiseman, p. 236.
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such a great obstruction and darkness and unlikeness between faculties
and being—in which God lives—that the spirit cannot achieve union
with its own being, which would be its own (domain) and its eternal
resting place, were it not for sin. For whoever lives without sin lives in
likeness and in grace, and God is his own (domain). And thus there is
need for grace.132
Grace is absolutely necessary for deification—in each of his major works
Ruusbroec gives an extensive treatment of the seven gifts of the Holy
Spirit—but for him too grace seems to have only an intermediate function:
through it we come to participate in the Father’s Image and share the
intratrinitarian life which is beyond grace.
Grace has above all become available in Christ. Unlike Eckhart, Ruus-
broec has a sophisticated and comprehensive Christology. In this article I
cannot do justice to this important aspect of his theology; however, an elabo-
rate treatment would be a needless exercise for on this issue there are not
sufficient elements available to make a relevant comparison between Ruus-
broec’s thought and that of Eckhart: apart from some general and scattered
remarks, Eckhart has very little to say on the role of the historical Christ in
our redemption. Christ’s Passion and his self-gift in the Eucharist hardly
figure in his writings.133 This different emphasis is evident from Ruusbroec’s
very first work, The Realm of Lovers, probably written in the early 1330s.134 The
book has a highly complicated structure, built around an intricate intercon-
nection of the seven gifts of the Spirit, the beatitudes, the angelic hierarchy,
the hierarchy of man’s lower and higher faculties and, not least, a growing
likeness to the Person of Christ, both in his human and divine nature. (This
emphasis on the humanity and life of Christ, again Franciscan in origin, was
to exert a considerable influence on the Devotio Moderna.)
Creation in God’s Image and likeness is only the first of four signs of
love God has shown us.135 The second is the Incarnation (an illustration of
the humble nature of God, according to Ruusbroec). Here Ruusbroec’s
speculative bias is illustrated by his recuperation of the so-called theory of
physical redemption, which we have encountered in the more traditional
writings of Eckhart as well. The third is the Passion. Here it is worthwhile to
observe that Ruusbroec considerably qualifies Anselm’s theory of satisfac-
tion in the light of his analysis of the reciprocal nature of love. The Cross is
the most sublime sign and cause of the restoration of the reciprocal love
between God and man, a love that needs to be mutual because it mirrors
132. Br.b 1735–45.
133. There are some exceptions, although the statement generally holds true.
See for example Sermon XLV no. 464–68 in which Eckhart spells out how one ought
to carry Christ’s Cross (McGinn II, p.231–33).
134. J. Wiseman, “Introduction” to John Ruusbroec: The Spiritual Espousals and
other works, p. 7.
135. For the four signs of love, see Sp.III.165–72, Wiseman, p. 212–17.
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the trinitarian life in its dual aspect of movement and stillness, threeness
and oneness, “flowing forth” and “drawing in,” “generosity” and “avidity.”
Only the God-man, the sinless Mediator between God and humanity, could
re-establish this reciprocity; God’s selfgift in the Cross enables us to return
his gift. The close link with the Eucharist, the fourth sign of love in which
we receive in order to give, “in which we eat and are being eaten” is clear.136
Christ opens the door to the intratrinitarian life: He transforms our sensual
life (through the gift of his bodily life, both in the Eucharist and in his
exemplary life), our higher faculties (through the gift of his spirit), and our
personality137 (through the gift of his personality, whereby we are capable
of “transcending ourselves and the createdness of Christ and rest in our
inheritance, that is, the divine essence, in eternity”).138
This divine essence should not be understood in an Eckhartian sense.
As will have become clear by now, Ruusbroec puts the mystery of the Trinity
at the heart of his doctrine in noticeable contrast with Eckhart, who wanted
to penetrate into the Godhead beyond the Trinity. Their concepts of the
mature Christian life will differ accordingly. For Eckhart, this goal is detach-
ment, based on the connaturality of the divine and human intellect:
Therefore I say, if a man turns away from self and from all created
things, then—to the extent that you do this—you will attain to oneness
and blessedness  in  your soul’s  spark, which time and place never
touched. This spark is opposed to all creatures: it wants nothing but
God, naked, just as He is. It is not satisfied with the Father or the Son
or the Holy Ghost, or all three Persons so far as they preserve their
several properties. . . . it wants to get into its simple ground, into the
silent desert into which no distinction ever peeped, of Father, Son or
Holy Ghost.139
Ruusbroec’s spiritual goal is the Common Life (een ghemeyn leven),
modeled after the dynamic of the trinitarian life itself, based on a radical
interpretation of the traditional doctrine of exemplarism. In the life of the
“common” man activity and rest or contemplation are perfectly integrated
in an exact reflection of the  intratrinitarian dynamics  in  its out-going
in-going and enjoyable or essential moments:
God’s Spirit drives us [“breathes us out”] towards loving and virtuous
activity, and He draws us back in to rest and enjoy . . . Therefore, to go
in in idle enjoyment, and to go out in virtuous activity, and to remain
constantly united with God’s Spirit: this is what I mean.140
136. Rg.I.52; Sp.III.158.
137. Br.b 1337–6.
138. Br.b 1394–97.
139. Sermon 48, W.II. p. 105.
140. Jan Van Ruusbroec, Werken III, Van VII Trappen, pp. 221–72, ed. L. Reypens
(Tielt: Lannoo, 1947), p.269.
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In an almost untranslatable passage Ruusbroec summarizes this ideal of the
“common” man (een ghemeyn mensche):
on the one hand the mind (ghedachte) is turned to all virtues, so that it
perfectly resembles the fruitful nature of God, which incessantly flows
out according to the Persons with every gift to meet the need of
creatures; at the same time this man’s mind will remain essentially
suspended (weselijc inhanghende), so that he is being transformed in the
fathomless clarity just like the divine Persons sink away every moment
in their fathomless being/essence (wesen), and overflow (there) in
enjoyment; yet they are eternally outflowing and active according to
Personhood in the fruitful nature. . . . The noble, “common” man . . .
flows out with every virtue and he is similar to God who flows out with
all his gifts; and he remains within in eternal enjoyment with God above
all gifts.141
III. CONCLUSION
In my view, an accurate comparison of two authors who seem to share a
common terminology requires that one takes into account the larger con-
text of their thought rather than merely focusing on one or two key notions
disconnected from the general framework of their doctrine. For this reason
I first outlined Eckhart’s thought in general before expounding his theol-
ogy of the Image.
The relation between God and creation can be characterised as “asym-
metric identity”: God as intellect is beyond being, and yet being is God;
creaturely perfections are divine in nature—for creatures in themselves are
nothing—and yet God is fundamentally unlike his creation. Thus Eckhart
stresses both the radical dependence of creatures on God and the absolute
otherness of God, a conviction shared by other negative theologians. Only
the intellect is connatural with the divinity.
In the second part of our exposition of Eckhart’s doctrine we investi-
gated in more detail the role of the intellect as Image of God. We observed
that Eckhart seems to obfuscate the distinction between the generation of
141. Rg.I.100. The ghedachte is the ground of the soul, closely related to the
memory. As indicated earlier, this approach is in contrast with Eckhart who pays
little attention to the memory and for whom the ground of the soul is intellectual
in nature. In another passage, Ruusbroec, speaking of an inward life according to
justice, writes: “Thus the person is just and goes to God with inner love by eternal
activity; and he goes into God with enjoyable inclination, by eternal rest; and he
abides in God and yet, he goes out to all creatures in a common love [in ghemeynre
minne], in virtues and in justice. And this is the summit of the inner life. All the
people who do not possess rest and activity have not obtained this justice.” (Br.b
2274–80).
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the Son within the Trinity on the one hand and both God’s creative and
re-creative act on the other. He asserts the identity of the divine ground and
the soul’s ground, of the birth within the Trinity and within the soul. The
problem is not the affirmation of identity as such (we could understand
such statements as expressing an indistinguishableness), but the connatu-
rality which supports this assertion. There is no distinction between the
Word and the soul insofar as it is intellect. When Eckhart appeals to the
Neoplatonic principle of the redditio completa to explain how the soul can
participate in the return of the intellectual nature upon itself, the reader is
left wondering whether this teaching can be reconciled with a theology of
grace. I drew the reader’s attention to the fact that occasionally more
traditional teaching can be found in Eckhart’s writings, but his more dis-
tinctive and original ideas are not shared by Ruusbroec. (Neither is there
any evidence to suggest that Ruusbroec is indebted to Eckhart for the
traditional teaching they occasionally share.)142
However, this is not the place to evaluate Eckhart’s orthodoxy; I only
want to indicate that Ruusbroec’s writings are free from the ambiguities that
characterize Eckhart’s works. Ruusbroec is careful to state the difference
between the generation of the Son and God’s free act of creation; between
our uncreated life as Idea in the Son and our created life; and finally,
between the soul as made to the Image and the Son as the Image of the
Trinity. Ruusbroec has a refined sacramental theology and a sophisticated
Christology in which the life and humanity of Christ receive due attention.
This seems another Franciscan element in his thought, quite alien to that
of the Dominican Meister.
Ruusbroec situates the ground of the soul in the ghedachte or
Augustinian memory, while he reserves the notion of the sparkle of the soul
for the will, in contrast with Eckhart who repeatedly uses these concepts to
denote the intellect. Seeing that Ruusbroec explicitly rejects any connatu-
rality between God and soul he stresses the importance of grace. Therefore
it comes as no surprise to find that he adopts the distinction between image
and likeness, again in marked contrast with Eckhart.
However, there is an even more fundamental difference between our
two authors. Ruusbroec’s significance lies in the fact that he is an original
trinitarian thinker. The notion of regyratio permeates his whole thought.
The Spirit is an active principle through which the divine Persons flow back
with enjoyment into their shared unity from where they go out again in a
never-ending dynamic of ebb and flow. Although I suggested that Ruus-
broec’s trinitarianism shares some essential features with that of Bonaven-
ture (fecundity of divine nature, primacy of the Father, exemplarism), this
central notion of regyratio makes his thought quite unique within the Chris-
142. Even a charitable interpretation cannot obscure the bare fact that Eck-
hart’s Christology is underdeveloped and his sacramental theology almost non-
existent.
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tian tradition. It also qualifies his understanding of the nature of love, as I
tried to make clear by contrasting his thought with that of Richard of St.
Victor.
Furthermore, it is revealing to compare the notion of regyratio with that
of redditio completa. In Ruusbroec’s view the regyratio occurs through the
Spirit, the mutual Love of Father and Son. The redditio completa is the return
of the Intelligible principle upon itself (the Son flows back to the Father)
in which no role is ascribed to the Spirit; because of the connaturality of the
human and divine intellect the soul can return to the Father and penetrate
even further beyond the Persons in the Godhead, whereas in Ruusbroec’s
view the soul can participate in its eternal life as Idea within the Trinity
(traditional exemplarism) after having been transformed through grace. As
said earlier, he explicitly rejects the idea that this could be a natural process.
In short, behind a shared vocabulary (birth of the Son in the soul,
Image theology, sparkle of the soul, ground of the soul, and so on) lies
veiled two very  different  theologies.  Some of  Ruusbroec’s main tenets
appear to be rather Franciscan in inspiration, mainly in his trinitarian
thought, Christology (focus on humanity and divinity of Christ), and even
anthropology (in Ruusbroec’s doctrine the intellect is not given the domi-
nant role it holds for the Dominican Meister)—although he develops espe-
cially the first area in a highly original way (Holy Spirit as active principle
of regyratio).
Eckhart’s and Ruusbroec’s understanding of exemplarity and theology
of the Image are radically different. Whereas Eckhart’s doctrine centers
around the connaturality of the divine and human intellect, nothing of that
sort can be found in Ruusbroec’s writings. Their different theologies result
in distinct spiritual aims: detachment for the German Preacher, the Com-
mon Life for the Prior of Groenendaal. For all these reasons, I consider it
inappropriate to situate Ruusbroec in the spiritual movement of which
Eckhart has come to be regarded as the main exponent and representative.
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